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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(J)(1996).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Was the district court's decision in favor of Provo City consistent with the prior
appellate decision by the Utah Court of Appeals? See Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah
App. 1994).
2. Was the district court's decision denying appellants' claim for damages due to a taking
by the city supported by the legal principles governing the case?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case began as a quiet title action. On remand it was treating as a taking case with
damages the possible remedy. There are no disputed issues of fact. The issues in this case raise
questions of law which must be reviewed on appeal for correctness. Ward v. Richfield City, 798
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). The trial court's decision in this case also interprets Utah statutes.
"A trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a question of law which is reviewed on appeal
for correctness." Ward v. Richfield City.
The only issue raised on this appeal is regarding the determination by the trial court that
Provo City, as trustee, rightfully disposed of the property. The trial court in this case was
following the direction of the Court of Appeals in the earlier appeal where this Court directed:
we remand this matter to the trial court to consider City's role as trustee of the Roadway,
with its attendant fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, in this case, the collective
occupants of the town.
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37.
1

The decision of the trial court is attached hereto as Addendum A and to Appellants' Brief as
Appendix C.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appellee concurs with the appellants' list of applicable statutes which appellants included
as Appendix A to their brief. Appellants also attached two cases they felt were determinative of
the issue as Appendix B to their brief. Appellee includes a copy of Knight v. Thomas, 101 P.
383 (Utah 1909) as Addendum B to this brief. Appellee's arguments regarding these statutes and
cases are contained within the Argument portion of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
When this case was previously on appeal, this Court summarized the facts and appellants
included that summary of the facts as their statement of the case. We concur that those facts
cited by this court are undisputed and were the same facts used to guide the trial court on
remand. Nelson. 872 P.2d at 35-36.
The remainder of appellants' statement of the case appears to be the beginning of their
argument and an attempt to establish that the trial court did not adhere to the legal conclusions
reached by this court on the earlier appeal. Appellee does not agree with these legal conclusions
and respectfully suggests that this Court treat this portion of appellants' statement of the case as
argument.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In the first appeal of this matter, this Court found that the city was the "holder of the
roadway in trust." Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37. The Court remanded the case to the district court to
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"...consider City's role as trustee of the Roadway, with its attendant fiduciary duties to the
beneficiaries, in this case, the collective occupants of the town." Nelson, 872 P.2d at 37.
On page 3 of the court's Trial Decision, Judge Davis states:
the Court believes the facts of this case to be very unique, and therefore, the cases which
counsel has cited to the Court have not proved to be very helpful.
See Addendum A.
The cases relied upon by appellant arise out of the normal situation where a private
landowner dedicates a portion of his land for a public street as a part of the subdivision of his
land for further development. Appellee understands that in such a case the city merely receives a
right of way for public use and that homeowners along the newly dedicated street take to the
center of the road in accordance with statute (and the common law in cases that arose prior to
codification of the common law). That is not what happened in this case. The roadway existed
at the time of the patent from the United States of America. The patent gave the mayor of Provo
City legal title in trust. The residents of Provo held the equitable title. Judge Davis stated it this
way in his Trial Decision.
The case was remanded to consider the City's role as trustee of the Roadway. Plaintiffs
have not presented evidence that anyone other than the City or the collective occupants of
the City were equitable owners of the property prior to the 1869 patent, and therefore, this
Court must conclude that the city became the holder in trust of legal title to the Roadway
and the collective occupants of the city of Provo held equitable title to the Roadway
pursuant to the 1869 Land Patent.
The City subsequently conveyed portions of the property surrounding the Roadway to
different individuals or entities. Plaintiffs have asserted that a conveyance of land
abutting a road impliedly conveys the land to the middle of the road (in spite of a metes
and bounds description which does not include any portion of the Roadway). The Court
believes that Plaintiffs' argument would have merit if the City and the collective
occupants of the city of Provo only had a right-of-way or an easement to use the road.
See Addendum A, Trial Decision, at 3-4,
3

ARGUMENT
I. The Trial Court Correctly Applied The Law Of The Case
This case was tried and appealed to this Court in an earlier ruling, Nelson v. Provo City,
872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994). This Court determined in that earlier case that the city became
the holder of the roadway in trust. As indicated earlier, the city established the roadway prior to
the patent issued by the United States. The roadway was not given to the city for a right of way
nor did the city merely have an easement. At the time of the patent, the occupants of the city had
equitable ownership of the roadway. In 1869, pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act of 1867, the
United States issued a patent which included the roadway and the abutting lands. Subsequently,
the city, through the trustee, Provo Mayor Abraham O. Smoot, issued deeds to the property to the
north and south of the roadway. It is undisputed that the abutting landowners never occupied the
roadway or the abutting lands at the time of the patent. The deeds from Mayor Smoot ran to the
edge of the roadway but did not specifically exclude it.
Appellants' base their argument on the claim that the city did not obtain a deed and
therefore did not own the roadway. This Court held:
We (1) hold that the Townsite Act conveyed the Roadway to the City in trust only; (2)
hold that City never explicitly reserved the Roadway pursuant to statute.
Id. at 38.
This Court then remanded the case to the trial court with the following instruction:
we remand this matter to the trial court to consider city's role as trustee of the Roadway,
with its attendant fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, in this case, the collective
occupants of the town. See 43 U.S.C. § 718.
Id. at 37.
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The trial court followed the holding of this Court and the direction on remand. The court ruled:
Plaintiffs have not presented evidence that anyone other than the City or the collective
occupants of the City were equitable owners of the property prior to the 1869 patent, and,
therefore, this Court must conclude that the city became the holder in trust of legal title to
the Roadway and the collective occupants of the city of Provo held equitable title to the
Roadway pursuant to the 1869 Land Patent.
See Addendum A, Trial Decision, at 3-4.
The trial court's ruling was clearly consistent with the mandate given by this Court on the earlier
appeal. Appellants' argument that it is contrary to the law of the case is not supported by the
record.
The trial court further found:
...that the City acted within its fiduciary powers and responsibility when it determined
that it was in the best interest of the collective occupants of the city of Provo to realign
the Roadway to create a functional intersection, and when it sold the Roadway property
which it held in trust to a private party and deposited the proceeds in the general treasury
for the benefit of the collective occupants of the city of Provo.
See Addendum A, Trial Decision, at 5-6.
The trial court did follow the law of the case in the remand from this Court and concluded
that the city had complied with the law in its sale of a portion of the roadway. The arguments
that follow show that the trial court made the correct decision even though it was contrary to
what appellants felt should have happened.
II. The Transfer Of Land Bounded By A Roadway Does Not Always Pass Title To The
Center Of The Roadway
The general rule is that upon the vacation of a street or highway, title passes to the center
of the roadway. This rule presumes the notion that the only public interest in the roadway is a
right of way or easement. It is undisputed that "[a] transfer of land bounded by a highway on a
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right-of-way for which the public has only an easement passes title of the person whose estate is
transferred to the middle of the highway." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-103(3), previously 27-12-101
(1953, as amended 1991)(emphasis added). This statute is applicable to transfers of property
where a developer has dedicated land for a public way or where private land has otherwise been
dedicated as a street. It presumes that the city has no right, title or interest in or to the land itself
apart from an easement for public use. See Knight v. Thomas. 101 P. 383, 384 (Utah 1909).
This statute is inapplicable where the city has more than an easement for public use in the street.
It is undisputed that Provo City occupied the roadway prior to the federal patent and prior
to the sale of any of the abutting lands. It held an equitable interest in the roadway that could
have become a fee simple interest if the trustee, Mayor Smoot, had issued a deed for the
roadway. Because he did not, this Court found in the prior appeal that the city did not obtain fee
simple title to the roadway. However, the trustee power remained with the mayor of Provo and
both this Court and the trial court found that the city's interest in the roadway was one of trustee
for the benefit of the collective occupants of the city.
Appellants rely on Falula Farms. Inc. v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569 (Utah App. 1993) to
support their position that the owner of abutting land owned to the center of the highway. It is
important to look at the actual language of the court.
Common law principles regarding highways, roads, and public rights-of-way prescribe
that the public obtains only an easement in a highway or road dedicated for public use.
(Citations omitted). Furthermore, at common law the owner of land which abutted a
highway owned up to the middle of the highway. (Citations omitted). Thus, common
law principles gave the public, represented by local government, no more than an
easement in land dedicated as a public highway or road. Consequently, when a city or
county abandoned or vacated a dedicated highway or road, the abutting landowners
owned and possessed the underlying property to the middle of the highway or road.
(Citations omitted).
Id. at 571.
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It is clear that the court is referring to property dedicated for public use such as streets in a
subdivision, which was the case in Falula Farms. In that case, the cases cited by the court in
support of its holding, all involved streets or highways which had been dedicated by a private
property owner to the town or city for public use. Thus, because the facts of Falula Farms and
this case are significantly different, the rule announced in Falula Farms is not applicable to this
case anymore than the current statute cited above is applicable. As the trial court pointed out, the
facts of this case are very unique and prior cases do not address the precise issue raised by the
plaintiff at the trial or the appellant on appeal. See Addendum A, Trial Decision, at 3.
III. When 900 South Was Partially Vacated, The City Retained Ownership In Trust
As pointed out by Appellants, in this case's prior appeal, the court did not determine the
exact interest which Provo City held in 900 South street. The Court stated:
While City may hold the Roadway in fee simple, that interest is held in trust. Thus, even
if City as trustee had (or could have) properly vacated the Roadway, City's interest would
still be held in trust and not in absolute ownership.
Nelson, 872 P.2d at 38. The trial court found that the city did hold the property in trust and that
it properly executed its fiduciary duties by placing the proceeds from the sale of the land that
formerly constituted a portion of the roadway into the general fund of the city for the benefit of
all of the citizens of Provo City. Here, appellants seek a special interest in the property to the
detriment of the collective other citizens of Provo City.
Appellants cite Sears v. Qgden City, 572 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977) in support of their
position. They offer the following quote from the decision.
This court has held that the interests a municipal body acquires in the streets in a platted
subdivision is a determinable fee. Upon vacation by the governing authorities, the fee
reverts to the abutting property owners.
7

Sears, 572 P.2d at 1359 (citing White v. Salt Lake Citv. 121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d 210 (Utah 1952)
(Emphasis added). Sears is clearly distinguishable from the present case because Provo City did
not acquire its interest in 900 South as part of a "platted subdivision," and it is this distinction
that separates this case from those cases cited by the appellants.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a city may own a street in fee. In Knight v.
Thomas, 101 P. 383 (Utah 1909), the court held:
[w]hen a street [in Provo City] is vacated, the right to occupy and use the land belongs to
him in whom the fee is - the city, or the original land owner if it was reserved by him and
not conveyed, or to the abutting property owner - and the land then is subject to all the
use and enjoyment and burdens of other lands; and if the fee is in the city the land is just
as much real property as is other lands owned by the city. It being alleged that the fee of
the land is in the city, the act of the council in vacating the street could no more affect its
right or title to the land than the right or title of another if the fee had been in him.
Knight, 101 P. at 384.,
This old case, although not exactly on point with the current case, also involved a street that
predated the patent from the United States and involved a question of ownership.
IV. The Patent Conveyed Legal Title To Provo City, With The Citizens Holding Equitable
Title
Hall v. North Ogden Citv, 175 P.2d 703 (Utah 1946) further echoes this point. The Hall
case deals with the Federal Townsite Act of 1867 and sets out the history, purpose and intent of
the Act. Equitable ownership of the land was held by the inhabitants of the land while legal title
was held by the United States. Appellants correctly point out that the purpose of the Act was to
merge the equitable ownership of the occupants of the land with the legal title which was passed
through the patent from the United States to a trustee.
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In the case at bar, equitable ownership of the street was held by the occupants of Provo
City as the users of the land and the mayor of Provo City was appointed as trustee through the
Act. The city, as trustee, maintained this ownership up to the time the street was vacated. It then
exercised its duties as trustee by taking the proceedsfromthe sale of the land and using them for
the benefit of the occupants of the city.
Appellants admit all of this in their brief. On pages 29-30 they state:
The patent from the U.S. government to A.O. Smoot, in trust, conveyed only bare legal
title to the land. At the time the trust was created, the occupants were the beneficiaries
under the trust and also were the equitable owners of the land being occupied. The
trustee had the duty to convey legal title to the occupants of the land in order to merge
legal title and equitable title.
The title conveyed by patent by the United States was legal title to the land and is the highest
form of title under property law. The holders of equitable title were the citizens of Provo. Since
a deed was never issued, this relationship continued until the street was vacated and the land sold
to a third party. At that time, the city, as holder of legal title in trust, conveyed the benefits of the
sale to the holders of equitable title, the citizens of Provo.
Appellants attempt to compare the facts of Hall with the facts of the current case.
Although both cases involve the Federal Townsite Act, the similarities cease there. The streets
and highways in Hall were merely shown on a plat and were never used as streets. The city in
Hall attempted to claim ownership of the streets, but the Utah Supreme Court held that the streets
had been abandoned and the ownership should revert to the occupants of the land who were the
equitable owners. Unlike Hall the street in this case was in existence at the time of the patent
and continued to be used as a street until the current vacation. The street was never abandoned,
but was vacated; the city, as trustee, then sold the property to a third party and used the proceeds
for the benefit of the equitable owners of the street, the citizens of Provo City.
9

Utah Code Ann. § 57-7-17 provided for the setting aside of parcels of land for streets and
other public purposes. It stated that a deed may be issued by the mayor (or equivalent public
official in other jurisdictions) to set aside the parcel for such public purposes. It is undisputed
that Mayor Smoot did not issue such a deed. However, appellants arrive at the wrong conclusion
based upon this fact. They conclude that because no deed was issued the trial court was in error.
In fact the trial court was exactly correct in applying the undisputed facts. The city was granted
legal title through the patent and the occupants of the city held the equitable title. A deed would
have resolved any dispute over ownership, but the fact remains that the city remained the holder
of the legal title in trust and the occupants of the city continued to hold the equitable title. When
the parcel was sold and a deed issued, legal and equitable title were merged and the new owner
held a fee absolute.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court must affirm the decision of the trial court.
DATED this / j

day of January, 2000.
PROVO CITY ATTORNEYS OFFICE

£

By: DAVID C. DIXON
Assistant City Attorney
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I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief,
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David N. Mortensen
Ivie & Young
226 West 2230 North, Suite 120
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DAVID C. DIXON
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TRIAL DECISION

BOYD NELSON, LORRAINE NELSON,
STEPHEN WHITLOCK, and SHEILA
WHITLOCK,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

CASE NO. 910400527
DATE: February 17, 1995

PROVO CITY, a Municipal Corporation,

JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for trial on February 6, 1995. Plaintiffs appeared
and were represented by James G. Clark. Defendant Provo City was represented by David C.
Dixon. The Court heard testimony and received various documentary evidence, and took the
matter under advisement. The Court, after carefully considering the evidence and arguments
of counsel, now enters the following:
DECISION
L
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
This matter was tried previously and appealed. The Utah Court of Appeals issued an
opinion cited as Nelson v. Provo City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah App. 1994). The facts are
essentially undisputed, and this Court lists the facts substantially the same as the Court of
Appeals.

1

Pursuant to the Federal Townsite Act of 1869, the federal government deeded the 900
South street, "Roadway", along with the abutting lands in trust to the local municipal
authority, Provo Mayor Abraham O. Smoot, as trustee. The Roadway existed as a public
thoroughfare prior to this conveyance. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs' predecessors
in interest did not occupy the Roadway or the abutting property at the time of the Townsite
conveyance. Nor do they dispute that the metes and bounds of each subsequent conveyance
ran to the Roadway but did not specifically include it.
In 1871, Smoot deeded land north of the Roadway to James Dunn, who in 1876
deeded the parcel to Peter Stubbs. In 1982, a portion of the Stubbs parcel was deeded to
Plaintiffs Stephen Whitlock and Sheila Whitlock. In 1985, Stephen Whitlock alone received
another portion of the Stubbs parcel. Finally, in 1991, Plaintiffs Boyd Nelson and Lorraine
Nelson received a deed for another portion of the Stubbs parcel.
In 1875, Smoot deeded land south of the Roadway to John P.R. Johnson, as trustee of
the First Ward Pasture Company. In 1927, First ward Pasture Company deeded its parcel to
the City. 900 South continued to be used as a public roadway. In August of 1989, the City
attempted to vacate the Roadway, but did not follow proper procedures. Shortly after the
purported vacation, the City rerouted a portion of 900 South onto the property it owned to the
south of the original route and sold the vacated portion of the original route to a commercial
developer. Landowners sued the City claiming a reversionary interest in the Roadway from
their property lines to the middle of the Roadway. On July 6, 1992, the trial court entered its
verdict which was appealed. The appellate Court remanded the matter "for consideration of
City's role as trustee of the Roadway, with its attendant fiduciary duties to the
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beneficiaries

" Nelson, 872 P 2d at 38 Under this general statement of remand, essentially

a trial de novo was held, and facts and evidence were presented to this Court

a
ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT
(1)

Whether Plaintiffs have a reversionary interest in the north half of the street formerly
known as 900 South which entitles them to compensation for its taking?

(2)

Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to just compensation for damage suffered as a result of
the loss of their corner lots after the realignment of 900/920 South?

IDL

DISCUSSION
The Court believes the facts of this case to be very unique, and therefore, the cases
which counsel has cited to the Court have not proved to be very helpful. In the Court's
estimation, this Case turns on two simple questions with difficult answers (1) do Plaintiffs
have any interest in the north half of the property formerly known as 900 South, and (2) is
the loss of a corner lot as a result of realignment of the city streets a loss which warrants
compensation from the city? In answering these questions, the burden is on the Plaintiffs to
show that the evidence preponderates in their favor.
A.

The Plaintiffs Did Not Have an Interest In Any Portion of 900 South.
The Court of Appeals held that "the Townsite Act conveyed the Roadway to City in

trust only." Nelson 872 P 2d at 38. The case was remanded to consider the City's role as
trustee of the Roadway

Plaintiffs have not presented evidence that anyone other than the

City or the collective occupants of the City were equitable owners of the property prior to the

3

1869 patent, and therefore, this Court must conclude that the city became the holder in trust
of legal title to the Roadway and the collective occupants of the city of Provo held equitable
title to the Roadway pursuant to the 1869 Land Patent.
The City subsequently conveyed portions of the property surrounding the Roadway to
different individuals or entities. Plaintiffs have asserted that a conveyance of land abutting a
road impliedly conveys the land to the middle of the road (in spite of a metes and bounds
description which does not include any portion of the Roadway).1 The Court believes that
Plaintiffs' argument would have merit if the City and the collective occupants of the city of
Provo only had a right-of-way or an easement to use the road.
The Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, James Dunn, obtained a deed to his property in
1871. The metes and bounds description of his deed excluded the street. In the Court's
determination, the fact that the City held title to the land on which the Roadway was located
(albeit in trust) leads to the conclusion that the Roadway was not a road made pursuant to the
grant of an easement which would carry with it a reversionary interest. Even supposing that
an easement was created when the City received the land in trust which already contained the
Roadway, the holder of the easement would be Provo City and the collective occupants of the
City of Provo—the same parties who held title to the underlying fee—under these
circumstances the easement would merge with the fee. The Court cannot conceive of (and
Plaintiffs have not presented preponderating evidence of) how the conveyance of property

1

Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-101 (1953 as amended) states: A transfer of
land bounded by a highway on a right-of-way for which the public has only an easement
passes the title of the person whose estate is transferred to the middle of the highway.
4

abutting the Roadway deprives the owners of the underlying fee to the Roadway of their title.2
The Court must now address the manner in which the City exercised its fiduciary
duties as trustee holding title of the underlying fee of the Roadway. The appellate court
determined that the City did not properly vacate the Roadway. However, in fact, it was not
necessary for the City to formally vacate the Roadway because it held the title to the
Roadway in trust. Vacatur procedures only seem necessary when the city simply has an
easement for a road which it no longer intends to use. Thus, even though the city did not
properly vacate the roadway, Plaintiffs could not have suffered damages specifically because
of the improper vacation. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs may be entitled to recovery
for damages caused because of the City's realignment of the street, and these issues will be
addressed in part B of this discussion.
This Court believes that the City acted within its fiduciary powers and responsibility
when it determined that it was in the best interest3 of the collective occupants of the city of
Provo to realign the Roadway to create a functional intersection, and when it sold the

2

Hypothetically, suppose the Court accepts Plaintiffs' theory that the landowner
of property abutting a road impliedly holds title to the middle of the road, and the Court
awarded Plaintiff the property up to the edge of the new road. Also, suppose the City
realigned the road so that the new road started in the middle of the old road. According to
Plaintiffs' theory, he would then be entitled to receive the property up to the middle of the last
road. Now, suppose the City realigned the road again moving it further south. In theory,
under these circumstances, Plaintiffs would be able to increase their acreage again by
claiming property to the middle of the last road without ever purchasing the property. This
theory creates a windfall for an abutting property owner who has never owned (nor has his
predecessors in interest ever owned) title to the underlying fee on which the road is located.
3

The City certainly had authority to exercise its police power to realign the
Roadway for the health, benefit and safety of the public. The issue here is who is entitled to
the property where the old road was located.
5

Roadway property which it held in trust to a private party and deposited the proceeds in the
general treasury for the benefit of the collective occupants of the city of Provo.4
B.

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION FOR THE LOSS OF THEIR
CORNER LOTS DUE TO THE REALIGNMENT OF THE ROADWAY.
At trial, Plaintiffs cited Utah cases to the Court asserting that they support the

Plaintiffs' claim for compensation for the loss of their corner lots. Defendant cited cases
asserting that the facts of this case do not entitle Plaintiffs to compensation. After carefully
reviewing all of the cases cited by counsel, the Court finds the discussion in Three D Corp. v.
Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 1321 (Utah App. 1988) which was cited and followed in Carpet
Barn v. State bv and Through DOT. 786 P.2d 770 (Utah App. 1990) to be most helpful. In
Three D Corp. after discussing the various precedents, the Court stated:
While it must be conceded that these precedents are not entirely consistent, we
believe they can be largely harmonized if viewed as establishing three general
principles: 1) Where governmental action, not amounting to a physical taking,
effectively deprives a property owner of reasonable access [sic] to property, the
owner is entitled to compensation, [sic]; 2) Where governmental action, not
amounting to a physical taking, merely interferes with an owner's access to
property, the owner is not entitled to compensation so long as the owner still
has reasonable access, [sic]; 3) Where governmental action, not amounting to a
physical taking, substantially impairs a right appurtenant to an owner's property,
or otherwise causes peculiar injury, and thereby results in substantial
devaluation, the owner is entitled to compensation, [sic].

Three D Corp. 752 P.2d at 1325-26.

4

The Court has not heard any evidence specifically as to how the City used the
proceeds of the sale of the Roadway property. Plaintiffs have not challenged the City's
administration of the trust nor has any other citizen of Provo. Counsel for the City
represented that the funds generated from the sale were deposited in the general fund of the
City. This was not disputed by Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court need not address further how
the city used the proceeds of a proper sell of trust property.
6

In the present case, no physical taking occurred, but Plaintiffs lost the status of
enjoying the benefits of a comer lot together with the other benefits of visibility, etc. which
are associated with a property located on a main thoroughfare (particularly on a comer). The
Court believes Plaintiffs' injury is of the peculiar type which entitles them to compensation.
Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miva. 526 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1974).
The Court next must determine the date of the injury. Plaintiffs argued that the date
of the injury was approximately September 18, 1991, when the City notified Plaintiffs of its
intent to begin construction on the disputed property and demanded Plaintiffs to remove all
property, vehicles, equipment and other materials on the old 900 South immediately south of
their property lines. The Court is not persuaded by this argument. The Court believes that
the actual cause of Plaintiffs injury occurred in August/September of 1989 when 900 South
was realigned taking away Plaintiffs' comer lots. Although the damage perhaps was not fully
realized until construction on the adjoining lot began, it is patently clear that it is the
realignment of the roadway which caused the compensable injury—the loss of comer lot
status. Immediately after the realignment, if a willing purchaser desired to purchase any
parcel of Plaintiffs' property, the price the willing purchaser would pay for an interior parcel
(which is the present status of Plaintiffs' property) would be significantly less than the price
the willing purchaser would be willing to pay for a comer lot (which was the former status of
Plaintiffs' property). Therefore, for purposes of determining Plaintiffs' damages, the value of
the damage should be determined as of the fall of 1989.
At trial, each party presented evidence through very qualified appraisers. Plaintiffs'
appraiser, however, only testified to the value of Plaintiffs' loss as of October of 1991.

7

Defendant's appraiser testified as to the value of Plaintiffs' loss as of July 1, 1989. In as
much as there was no evidence presented by Plaintiffs which valued their loss at the relevant
time period, the Court is left with no choice but to accept the values testified to by
Defendant's appraiser. Consistent with the appraisal prepared by Gary Free & Associates, the
Court finds that Plaintiffs Boyd and Lorraine Nelson suffered damages in the amount of
$17,134 and Plaintiffs Steven and Sheila Whitlock suffered damages in the amount of $3,966.
Additionally, Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the amount they were damaged at the legal
rate as of August/September of 1989.
The Court has considered the other claims made by Plaintiffs and finds them to be
unsupported by the evidence and without merit. Each party shall be responsible for their own
attorney fees. Counsel for Plaintiffs is instructed to prepare findings of fact and conclusions
of law consistent with this decision.

Dated at Provo, Utah, this 17th day of February, 1995.
BY THE COURT

cc:

James G. Clark, Esq.
David C. Dixon, Esq.
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JESSE KNIGHT, Appellant, v. HYRUM F. THOMAS, and others as members of the City Council of
Provo City, Utah, Respondents.
No. 1994.
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
35 Utah 470; 101 P. 383; 1909 Utah LEXIS 38
April 9, 1909, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] APPEAL from District
Court, Fourth District; Hon. T. D. Lewis, Judge.
Suit by Jesse Knight against Hyrum F. Thomas and others, as members of the City Council of Provo, Utah, to
enjoin them from vacating a street. From a judgment of
dismissal plaintiff appeals.
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED
WITH DIRECTIONS.
CORE TERMS: street, railroad, real property, depot,
tracks, electors, railway, occupy, franchise, vacate, municipal, city council, public way, submitting, demurrer,
exclusive right, land occupied, vacation, lawfully, occupied, board of trustees, restrained, prescribe, authorize,
belonging, locating, averred, alley
HEADNOTES: 1. RAILROADS-RAILROAD AID-"REAL PROPERTY." Comp. Laws 1907, section313x,
provides that any city council may aid the building of
railroads by granting real property of the city not necessary for municipal or public purposes on such limitations
as the council shall prescribe, etc. Held, that the words
"real property," as so used, include the city streets of
which the fee is in the city. (Page 472.)
2.
RAILROADS-PUBLIC AID-VACATING
STREETS-EXCLUSIVE USE-ELECTION-"REAL
PROPERTY." Comp. Laws 1907, section 313x,
authorizes the city council of any city to grant real
property belonging to the city, not necessary for
public purposes, for depot or other railroad purposes,
provided that no such grant shall be made unless
submitted to the qualified electors. Held, that a
proposed grant to a railroad of the exclusive right to
occupy a street in which the city owned the fee, and
which it was proposed to vacate, for one hundred years,
was a grant of "real property" within such section, and
could not be lawfully made without submitting the

question to the electors. (Page 472.)
3.
RAILROADS-FRANCHISES-RIGHTS IN
STREETS. Comp. Laws 1907, section 206, subd. 32,
authorizing city councils to grant franchises to railroad
and depot companies not longer than one hundred
years to lay, maintain, and operate railroad tracks in
streets and other public places, did not authorize the
city council to give a railroad or depot company the
exclusive right to occupy a street for railroad purposes
for that period. (Page 472.)
4.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STREETSVACATION. On the vacation of a street by a city the
title to the land reverts to the owner of the fee whether
the fee is in the city or an adjoining owner. (Page 474.)
COUNSEL: J. W. N. Whitecotton, E. E. Corfman and
Booth & Cluff for appellant.
Van Cott, Allison & Riter, S. R. Thurman and Grant C.
Bagley for respondents.
JUDGES: STRAUP, C. J. FRICK and McCARTY, JJ.,
concur.
OPINIONBY: STRAUP
OPINION: [*471] [**383] STRAUP, C. J.
This is an action praying for injunctive relief. Among
other things, it is alleged in the complaint, in substance,
That Provo City, a municipal corporation, is the owner
in fee of a certain described street in Provo City; that the
city council, by a proposed ordinance, will vacate the
street and close it to the public, and, unless restrained,
will grant to the Rio Grande Western Railway Company,
a railroad corporation, its successors and assigns, the
exclusive right to occupy and use the described land for
railroad and depot purposes for a period of one hun-

35 Utah. 470, *471; 101 P. 383, **383;
1909 Utah LEXIS 38, ***!.
dred year's; that upon the passage and approval of the
ordinance the [***2] railway company will at once take
the exclusive possession of the land so granted and will
exclude the public therefrom; and that the question of
making such a grant has not been submitted to the qualified electors of Provo City, as is by law in such case
made and provided. The relief prayed for is that the
council be enjoined from making the grant without first
submitting the question to the qualified electors. To this
complaint the defendantsfileda general demurrer, which
was sustained by the court below. The plaintiff declined
to amend, and. thereupon the action was dismissed, He
appeals.
We have a MdiHitc (sc< limit M3x, Comp, Laws 1907)
which, in par", jpeyii'iin1"
"The city council of any city, or board of trustees of
any incorporated town, of this state is authorized to aid
and encourage the building of railroads by granting to
any railroad company, for depot or other railroad purposes, real property of such city or incorporated town,
not necessary for municipal or public purposes, upon
such limitations and conditions as said council or board
of trustees may prescribe; provided, however, that no
such grant shall be made to any railroad company, unless the question of making said [***3] grant has been
submitted to the qualified electors of the city or town.
at the next municipal or special election to be called for
that purpose by the city council or town board."
[*472] By other statutes which define the general powers of a city council it is, among other things, provided
that it shall have power "to lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, extend, grade, pave, or otherwise improve
streets, alleys, avenues, sidewalks, parks, and public
grounds; and to vacate the [**384] same (subdivision
8, section 206); and "to permit, regulate, or prohibit the
locating, constructing, or laying of tracks of any railroad or tramway in any street, alley, or public place;
and to grant franchises to railroad companies, and to
union railroad depot companies, to lay, maintain, and
operate in any street or part or parts of streets of said
cities, or other public places therein, railroad tracks, am
union railroad depot connecting and terminal tracks, n
such permission shall not be for a longer time than one
hundred years." Subdivision 32, section 206.
The theory upon which the demurrer was sustained,
and upon which the ruling is defended, is that the
words "real property of such [***4] city or incorporated town," contained in section 313x, do not include
nor refer to, streets of such city or town. We think th;;
is true so far as the question pertains to a mere stre.
the city when the fee of the land occupied by the or upon which the public way exists is not in the u v v .
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town, and it otherwise has no right, title, or interest in,.
or to the land itself apart from the public way upon it;
but it is, in effect, alleged in the complaint that the city
is the owner in fee of the land described in the complaint
and occupied by the street, which land the council will,
unless restrained, grant to the railway company to be
exclusively used and. occupied by it for depot, and. railroad purposes for a period of one hundred years. For
the purposes of the demurrer the truth of these facts is
admitted. Such an ownership of or interest in property,
as alleged, undoubtedly is real property. While it is not
averred that the council will grant the fee of the land,
nor all the city's right, title, and interest therein, still the
granting to the railway company, as is alleged, the right
to exclusively occupy and use the land for a period of one
hundred years, is the granting of [***5] an interest, in
and 1*473] to the land itself, constituting real property.
Subdivision 10, section 2498, Comp. Laws 1907. Upon
the facts as alleged we think the grant cannot lawfully be
made without submitting the question of the making of
the grant to the qualified electors, as is provided in section 313x. It is said that the giving of such a construction
to the provisions of section 313x renders it in conflict
with subdivision 32 of section 206. We think not. The
subdivision of the latter section gives the council power
to grant franchises to railroad and depot companies, not
longer than one hundred years, to lay, maintain, and operate railroad tracks in streets and other public places;
but it will be observed, that the power conferred is not
so broad as to permit the granting of a franchise giving
a railroad or depot company the right to exclusively occupy and use the street and exclude the general public
therefrom. So long as the street—the public way on the
land -exists, it could not lawfully be turned over by the
council to the railway company to be by it exclusively
used and occupied, and it is not claimed that the council
had power or authority to so turn it over to the [***6]
railway company. The two sections deal with entirely
afferent subjects; section 313x, by placing an inhibition
jpon the granting of real property of a city or incorporated town without submitting the question of making
/ 'irair \o the qualified electors, and subdivision 32
'06, in permitting, regulating, or prohibiting
oj railroad tracks in streets and other pub, pLitv- [\w council is also given power to vacate
streets. It is given such power whether the fee of the
land occupied by the street is in the city or whether the
fee is in another,
If all the interest which the city had in and to the land
vas only with respect to the public way on the land,
Mm, on a vacation of the street, all its interest in and to
and ceased, An. attempted, grant made by the council
uch case to the railway company to exclusively use

35 Utah 470, *473; 101 P. 383, **384;
1909 Utah LEXIS 38, ***6
and occupy the land would not be granting real property
of the city, but the granting of real property belonging
to another. The petitioner, who, as averred, is a resident and taxpayer [*474] of the city, and not shown to
be an abutting property owner, nor otherwise shown to
have any interest in or to the land occupied by the street,
[***7] could not complain of such a threatened grant.
When the street is vacated, the right to occupy and use
the land belongs to him in whom the fee is-the city,
or the original landowner if it was reserved by him and
not conveyed, or to the abutting property owners-and
the land then is subject to all the use and enjoyment and
burdens of other lands; and if the fee is in the city the
land is just as much real property as is other lands owned
by the city. It being alleged that the fee of the land is
in the city, the act of the council in vacating the street
could no more affect its right or title to the land than the
right or title of another if the fee had been in him. We
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do not see wherein the sections of the statute giving the
city council the power to vacate streets, or to grant franchises to lay tracks in streets, have any bearing on the
question involved. The gist of the complaint, and the
commission of the acts against which restraint is prayed,
are, not that the council is about to wrongfully vacate the
street or grant a franchise to lay tracks therein, but that
the council will grant to the railway company the right
for a period of one hundred years to exclusively use and
occupy [***8] land the fee title of which is alleged to
be in the city.
We think the court erred in sustaining the demurrer.
The judgment of the court below is therefore reversed,
and the case remanded, with directions to reinstate it, to
overrule the demurrer, and give the defendants leave to
answer. Costs to appellant.
FRICK and McCARTY, JJ., concur.

